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Abstract—The paper considers the problem of detecting
cyber-attacks occurring in communication networks typically
used in the secondary control layer of DC microgrids. The pro-
posed distributed methodology allows for scalable monitoring of
a microgrid and is able to detect the presence of data injection
attacks in the communications among Distributed Generation
Units (DGUs) - governed by consensus-based control - and
isolate the communication link over which the attack is injected.
Each local attack detector requires limited knowledge regarding
the dynamics of its neighbors. Detectability properties of the
method are analyzed, as well as a class of undetectable attacks.
Some results from numerical simulation are presented to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Microgrids offer several advantages over conventional
electrical power networks. Due to localized generation and
compatibility with various renewable sources, they ensure
clean high quality power with minimal transmission losses.
Microgrids, both AC and DC, are composed of distributed
generation units (DGUs), storage, and loads. DC microgrids
(DCmGs) hold tremendous promise, as a large portion of
loads are inherently DC, and have attracted significant re-
search attention [1].
To ensure stable and efficient operation of microgrids, a
hierarchical control architecture is adopted [2]. The primary
control performs the decentralized control of local power,
voltage, and current [3], [4], [5]. The secondary and tertiary
layers deal with power quality regulation, load sharing, DGU
coordination, microgrid synchronization and optimization,
and enforcing system regulations [1], [5], [6], [7]. As shown
in [1], [8], certain secondary and tertiary objectives require
communication between the control layers. However, the
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information flowing through communication channels is vul-
nerable to malicious attacks and can be compromised [9],
[10], [11]. These attacks are aimed at hindering normal
microgrid operation and can have detrimental consequences
like voltage instability, damage of critical loads, blackouts,
etc [12]. Therefore, detection and isolation of attacks are
necessary in order to undertake remedial actions.
The field of attack detection and isolation, which plays a
central role in secure control systems, has attracted growing
interest in recent years [13], [14]. This is due to the fact that
an ever growing number of control systems are integrating
communication tools to regulate the processes. This in turn
has exposed them to attacks. Some approaches in security of
cyber-physical systems stem from prior research in the field
of fault detection and isolation (FDI), a well established area
of research which focuses on identifying if the behaviour of
the underlying process is healthy or whether it is subject
to a fault. The available literature on attack detection and
isolation, differently to that on cyber-security in the computer
science sense, attempts to exploit knowledge of the system
dynamics in order to verify whether communicated informa-
tion is corrupted or not [15]. Most work in the secure control
literature is based on centralized architectures [9], which in
many cases may not be appropriate given the complexity
of most cyber-physical systems. Hence, it is necessary to
develop distributed methodologies. In the literature, few
works, e.g. [10], [16], [17] point in this direction. In [10],
[16] the authors develop a distributed methodology to detect
attacks on the physical processes of subsystems, but it is
assumed that the communication between detectors is secure.
Furthermore, for design of the method in [17] knowledge
of the model of the entire system is required. On the
other hand, in the literature several contributions proposing
distributed FDI techniques have been presented [18], [19],
[20], [21], [22], [23]. In this work, we propose an attack
detection and isolation methodology which is able to identify
attacks present in the communication network supporting
a consensus-based secondary control for current sharing
in DCmGs. A novel estimator has been developed, based
on Unknown Input Observers (UIOs) [24]. The proposed
estimator is able to identify, with limited information of
the overall DCmG’s model, whether output measurements
received from its neighbors are corrupted by a data-injection
attack or not. Preliminary results have been presented in [25].
With respect to [25], local UIOs are exploited to estimate
the state of neighboring DGUs. Detection thresholds are
developed which ensure the absence of false alarms. To
the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first work
designing an attack detection architecture for DC microgrids.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II
the models of the DC microgrid and of the attack are
presented and the attack-detection problem is formulated.
In Section III, we briefly recall the distributed estimation
technique and detection strategy presented in [25], and its
limitations for DC microgrids are higlighted. In Section IV,
the monitoring architecture is sketched, unknown input ob-
servers are designed to estimate the state of the neighbors,
hence a detection threshold is designed and attack detectabil-
ity is analyzed. In order to validate the proposed technique,
in Section V, simulation results are provided showing the
effectiveness of the proposed technique.
Notation: In the paper, the operator | · | applied to a
set determines its cardinality, while used with matrices or
vectors it defines their component-by-component absolute
value. The operator ‖·‖ is used to define the matrix norm. In
general, in this paper inequalities are considered component-
by-component.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Model of the DC Microgrid
Consider a DC microgrid made of N distributed gen-
eration units (DGUs), which are modeled as in [4] and
are interconnected through power lines. In particular, [4]
exploits the Quasi Stationary Line (QSL) approximation
where interconnection power lines are supposed to be purely
resistive. The entire DC microgrid modeled in this way may
be seen as an undirected graph where the nodes represent
the DGUs, the edges represent the power lines connecting
the DGUs, and the weights of the edges are the resistances
of the power lines. The voltage and current dynamics for
DGU i are characterised as follows:
dVi
dt
=
1
Cti
Iti +
∑
j∈Ni
1
CtiRij
(Vj − Vi)− 1
Cti
ILi
dIti
dt
=
1
Lti
Vti − Rti
Lti
Iti − 1
Lti
Vi
, (1)
where (Vti, ILi) are inputs to the DGU, (Vi, Iti) are the
states, Vj ∈ Ni are the interconnection terms between the
DGUs, and Ni ⊂ N ≡ {1, . . . , N} is the set containing
neighboring DGUs, i.e. DGUs connected to DGU i through
power lines. Rti, Cti, Lti are electrical parameters of the
RLC filter of DGU i. Rij is the resistance of the power line
connecting DGUs i and j.
We now briefly summarize the control methodology in
[26], where a primary controller is designed to stabilize
the voltage of the DGUs, and a secondary consensus-based
controller is designed to achieve current sharing. The state-
space model of DGU i, considering also state disturbances
and measurement noise, is given by
x˙[i](t) = Aiix[i](t) +Biu[i](t) +Giα[i](t)
+Mid[i](t) + ξ[i](t) + w[i](t)
y[i](t) = Cix[i](t) + ρ[i](t)
, (2)
where x[i] = [Vi, Iti, v[i]]> is the local state. Note that v[i] is
added to the state to enable the integrator action required by
the primary control, and its dynamics are v˙[i] = Vref,i − Vi,
Vref,i being the reference for voltage Vi. Variables u[i] and
α[i] are the primary and secondary inputs of the DGU.
The term d[i] = [ILi, Vref,i]> is the exogenous input, and
ξ[i] =
∑
j∈Ni Aijx[j] is a vector modeling the physical in-
fluence of neighboring DGUs. The vectors w[i](t) and ρ[i](t)
model the unknown state disturbances and measurement
noises, respectively. The following assumption is needed:
Assumption 1: Process noise w[i](t) and measurement
noise ρ[i](t) are unknown vectors which are bounded for
all t by some known bounds, i.e.
|w[i](t)| ≤ w¯[i], |ρ[i](t)| ≤ ρ¯[i], ∀t ≥ 0 . (3)
The primary control input is u[i] = [Vti] = Kiy[i], where
matrix Ki is designed following the methodology in [4]. The
secondary consensus-based controller input α[i](t) is defined
according to the following consensus protocol:
α˙[i](t) = −
∑
j∈Ni
[0 kI 0]
(
y[i](t)
Isti
−
yc[j,i](t)
Istj
)
, (4)
where Isti > 0,∀i ∈ N are scaling factors appropriately
defined, and kI is the consensus weight common to all
DGUs. The term yc[j,i](t) represents the output measurement
of DGU j which is communicated to DGU i, and is defined
in the next subsection. Note that the secondary consensus-
based control in [26] requires that there be a communication
network connecting the controllers of DGUs. In this paper,
without loss of generality, we suppose that the topology of
the graph representing the physical interconnections of the
DGUs and that of the communication network are the same.
Matrices Aii, Bi, Mi, Aij , Ki, and Ci are defined as [3].
B. Attack Model
We now explain how the attack is modeled. We define the
attack as a data injection attack on the communicated data
between neighboring DGUs. In the considered scenario, it
is assumed that an attacker is able to inject falsified data
in the communication network linking neighboring DGUs.
We model these attacks by defining the output measurement
vector yc[i,j](t), communicated by DGU i to DGU j, as:
yc[i,j](t) = y[i](t) + β(t− Ta[i,j])φi,j(t), (5)
where y[i](t) is the unattacked measurement of state of the
i-th DGU, as given in (2), and β(t) is an activation function
whose value is 0 for t < 0 and 1 for t ≥ 0. Ta[i,j] denotes
the time of occurrence of an attack on the communication
line connecting node i to j. Note that neighboring DGUs
share the full output measurement vector.
We suppose that the attack can be active on a subset
N̂i ⊆ Ni of the communication lines between DGU i and
its neighbors, whilst we assume that, for each DGU, its own
measurements of its state are secure.
In the following, for notation simplicity, and without loss
of generality, we assume that the attack is concurrent among
all the attacked communication lines, i.e. Ta[j,i] = Ta. The
unknown attack function φi,j(t) is designed by the attacker
and models the data which is injected. In the sequel, a
detection technique to detect φi,j(t) is illustrated.
III. DISTRIBUTED ESTIMATION OF LOCAL STATE
VARIABLES
We design a distributed state estimator - similar to the
one given in [25] - based on a full-order Luenberger-like
observer and used by each DGU to estimate its local state.
This requires local model information, as well as output
measurements that are communicated from its neighbors and
are subject to possible attacks.
The dynamics of the local state estimator is:
˙ˆx[i](t) = Aiixˆ[i](t) +Biu[i](t) +Giα[i](t) +Mid[i](t)
+ ξˆ[i](t) + Li
(
y[i](t)− yˆ[i](t)
)
yˆ[i](t) = Cixˆ[i](t)
,
(6)
where xˆ[i](t), yˆ[i](t) are the state and output estimates, and
ξˆ[i](t) =
∑
j∈Ni Aijy
c
[j,i](t) is the locally computed inter-
connection vector from communicated measurements. Matrix
Li is designed such that ALi = (Aii − LiCi) is Hurwitz
stable. We assume that the estimator has perfect knowledge
of the exogenous input d[i](t) = [ILi, Vref,i]>. Indeed, ILi
can be measured, and Vref,i is a design parameter.
In order to determine whether the above distributed esti-
mator allows for attack detection, we analyze the residual
r[i](t) = y[i](t)− yˆ[i](t) .
Using (2) and (6) and owing to the definition of Ci, for
time t < Ta, i.e. before the onset of an attack, it is possible
to rewrite the residual as r[i](t) = [i](t) + ρ[i](t), where
[i](t) = x[i](t)− xˆ[i](t) is the state estimation error obeying
the following dynamics:
˙[i](t) = ALi[i](t)−
∑
j∈Ni
Aijρ[j](t) + w[i](t)− Liρ[i](t) .
(7)
Since ALi are Hurwitz stable for all i ∈ N , the dynamics in
(7) are BIBO stable and independent from the primary, sec-
ondary, or exogenous inputs. Indeed, Assumption 1 implies
the boundedness of [i](t). More specifically, let us compute
the solution of (7):
[i](t) = e
ALit[i](0) +
∫ t
0
eALi(t−τ)η[i](τ)dτ, (8)
where η[i](t) = −
∑
j∈Ni Aijρ[j](t) +w[i](t)−Liρ[i](t). As
ALi is Hurwitz stable by design, exist constants ν, λ > 0
such that
‖eALit‖ ≤ νe−λt .
Because of Assumption 1 and the BIBO stability of (7), it
is possible to use the triangle inequality to design a bound
¯[i](t) for the estimation error
¯[i](t) = νe
−λt¯[i](0) +
∫ t
0
νe−λ(t−τ)η¯[i]dτ, (9)
where η¯[i] =
∑
j∈Ni |Aij |ρ¯[j]+w¯[i]+ |Li|ρ¯[i]. The use of the
triangle inequality for the design of the bound implies that,
in the absence of an attack, the inequality
|[i](t)| ≤ ¯[i](t)
holds for suitable choice of ¯[i](0) ≥ |[i](0)|. It is then
possible to design an attack-detection threshold as follows:
r¯[i](t) = ¯[i](t) + ρ¯[i], (10)
such that
|r[i](t)| ≤ r¯[i](t) (11)
holds in healthy conditions. Hence it is sufficient that a com-
ponent of the residual crosses the corresponding threshold
to state that an attack is present. A thorough analysis of the
detectability properties of this method can be found in [25].
Limitations on attack detection
In the following we will analyze the limitations of this
method when applied to attack-detection for DC microgrids.
Proposition 1: If the attack functions φj,i(t) in (5) take
on the form
φj,i(t) = [0 γj,i(t) θj,i(t)]
>
, ∀j ∈ N̂i,∀t ≥ Ta (12)
where γj,i(t) and θj,i(t) are arbitrary functions, then residual
(10) is not affected by the attack.
Proof: The proofs of the propositions in this paper are
omitted due to space constraints.
Remark 1: Note that undetectable attacks characterized in
Proposition 1 turn out to be problematic. As γj,i(t) in (12)
influences the secondary control input in (4), an attacker
seeking to alter the consensus-based control input may do
so with limited knowledge of the DGU model, and without
violating detection test (11).
Given the above remark, it is necessary to enhance the
attack-detection scheme, as defined in the next section.
IV. ESTIMATION OF NEIGHBORING DGU STATES
To overcome the significant issue pointed out in Remark 1,
local validation of the transmitted information is necessary.
To this end, let us define the structure of the proposed attack
detection architecture used for each DGU. We design an
unknown input observer for the estimation by DGU i of
the state of each of its neighbors. Hence, a bank of |Ni|
UIOs is designed for detection, one for each of the neighbors
of DGU i. Once estimators are defined, bounds on the
estimation errors are derived, which lead to the design of |Ni|
detection thresholds, through which each of the residuals
are tested. Following design, detectability is analyzed, and a
sufficient condition for an attack to be stealthy is derived.
A. Unknown Input Observers
UIOs allow for state estimation even in the presence of
unknown inputs (see, for instance, [24]). This is a particularly
valuable feature in the case of DCmGs, as it allows DGU i
to estimate the states of DGUs j, j ∈ Ni, without requiring
knowledge of their secondary input, exogenous inputs and
of the states of their neighbors.
In order to design a UIO, we first recast the dynamics of
DGU j in (2) to be consistent with the typical UIO structure
[24]. Rewriting system dynamics in (2), one has:
x˙[j](t) = AKjx[j](t) + E¯j d¯[j](t) + w[j](t) +BjKjρ[j](t)
y[j](t) = Cjx[j](t) + ρ[j](t)
,
(13)
where AKj = Ajj + BjKj , matrix E¯j and vector d¯[j](t)
contain the inputs to DGU j which are unknown to the UIO
in DGU i. Specifically, they are defined as
E¯j =
 1Ctj 00 0
0 1
 , d¯[j] = Êj dˆ[j](t),
where
Êj =
[ −1 0 0 1Rjk1 0 0 . . . 1Rjk|Nj | 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
]
,
dˆ[j] =
[
d>[j](t), α[j](t), x
>
[k1]
(t), . . . , x>[k|Nj |](t)
]>
,
where {k1, k2, . . . , k|Nj |} are all the elements of Nj . Note
that for UIO design [24], it is necessary that E¯j be full
column rank. The full order observer for estimating the state
of DGU j in DGU i is:
z˙[j,i](t) = Fjz[j,i](t) + TjBu¯[j](t) + K̂jy
c
[j,i](t)
x˜[j,i](t) = z[j,i](t) +Hjy
c
[j,i](t)
(14)
where u¯[j](t) = 0,∀t. The filter matrices are designed
following [24] as:
(HjCj − I)E¯j = 0 (15)
Tj = I −HjCj (16)
Fj = TjAKj − K˜jCj (17)
K¯j = FjHj (18)
K̂j = K˜j + K¯j (19)
Proposition 2: If the UIO filter parameters are designed
following (15)-(19), in the absence of attacks the estimation
error ˜[j,i](t) = x[j](t) − x˜[j,i](t) behaves according to the
following dynamics:
˙˜[j,i](t) = Fj ˜[j,i](t)+Tjw˜[j](t)−Hj ρ˙[j](t)−K˜jρ[j](t) (20)
where w˜[j](t) = w[j](t) + (BjKj)ρ[j](t).
In order to design a UIO which converges to the actual
value of the state, it is necessary that the system dynamics
satisfy the following conditions:
i. rank(CjE¯j) = rank(E¯j) ;
ii. the pair (Cj , TjAKj) is detectable
Then, the following result can be proved.
Proposition 3: Given dynamics (13) and matrices defined
as in Section II-A, conditions (i) and (ii) hold.
In order to design the UIO it is necessary to define Hj such
that (15) holds, and K˜j such that Fj in (17) is stable. Then
the remaining matrices in (15)-(19) can be derived. Matrix
Hj satisfies (15) as long as it is in the following form:
Hj =
 1 Hj,1 00 Hj,2 0
0 Hj,3 1
 (21)
in which Hj,1, Hj,2, Hj,3 can be arbitrarily assigned. Hence
we compute matrices Tj , K˜j , K¯j , and K̂j . Given the
structure of Tj = I −Hj , the term TjAKj in (17) is
TjAKj =
 Tj,1AKj,21 Tj,1AKj,22 Tj,1AKj,23Tj,2AKj,21 Tj,2AKj,22 Tj,2AKj,23
Tj,3AKj,21 Tj,3AKj,22 Tj,3AKj,23

where Tj,1 = −Hj,1, Tj,2 = 1 − Hj,2, and Tj,3 = −Hj,3,
and AKj,ab is the (a, b)-th term of AKj . We now highlight
the information flow which must occur between DGUs j and
i such that the latter can estimate the state of the first:
1) At design time, DGU i requires that its neighbors com-
municate the second row of their closed-loop matrix
AKj,2 = [AKj,21, AKj,22, AKj,23],
as well as the value of their bounds w¯[j] and ρ¯[j] in (3),
needed for local computation of (25);
2) During online operations, DGU i requires transmission
of measurement output yc[j,i](t).
We have designed the UIOs in DGU i to estimate the
states of its neighbors. In the next subsection the residual
r˜[j,i](t) = y
c
[j,i](t) − Cj x˜[j,i](t) will be analyzed and a
detection threshold will be defined.
B. Detection Thresholds
As in the case for the estimator in Section III, note that
the residual in the absence of attacks, i.e. at time t < Ta is:
r˜[j,i](t) = Cj ˜[j,i](t) + ρ[j](t). (22)
Hence, by designing a bound on error ˜[j,i], it is possible to
exploit the triangle inequality to design a detection threshold.
The solution to (20) is:
˜[j,i](t) = e
Fjt˜[j,i](0)+
+
∫ t
0
eFj(t−τ)
[
Tjw˜[j](τ)− K˜jρ[j](τ)−Hj ρ˙[j](τ)
]
dτ.
(23)
Using integration by parts, to remove dependence from ρ˙[j]:
˜[j,i](t) = e
Fjt
[
˜[j,i](0) +Hjρ[j](0)
]−Hjρ[j](t)+
+
∫ t
0
eFj(t−τ)
[
Tjw[j](τ) +
(
TjBjKj − K̂j
)
ρ[j](τ)
]
dτ.
(24)
Note that, because Fj is Hurwitz stable by design, it is
possible to define constants κ, µ > 0 such that
‖eFjt‖ ≤ κe−µt,∀t ≥ 0.
Therefore a time-varying bound ˜[j,i](t) is designed:
˜[j,i](t) = κe
−µt
[
˜[j,i](0) + |Hj |ρ¯[j]
]
+ |Hj |ρ¯[j]
+
∫ t
0
κe−µ(t−τ)
[
|Tj | w¯[j] +
∣∣∣TjBjKj − K̂j∣∣∣ ρ¯[j]] dτ,
(25)
which, for suitably defined ¯˜[j,i](0) ≥ |˜[j,i](0)|, guarantees
that, in the absence of an attack,
|˜[j,i](t)| ≤ ˜[j,i](t) (26)
holds. Finally, it is possible to design the detection threshold:
¯˜r[j,i](t) = ˜[j,i](t) + ρ¯[j] (27)
for which in the absence of an attack the following is satisfied
|r˜[j,i](t)| ≤ ¯˜r[j,i](t). (28)
This inequality is then used to detect the presence of attacks.
In fact, it is sufficient for it to be violated for at least one
component of residual r˜[j,i](t) at some time Td for an attack
to be detected and the compromised communication link
isolated.
C. Detectability Analysis
We now analyze the detectability properties of the pro-
posed method. We start by analyzing the effect of the attack
modeled as in (5) on the estimation error dynamics in (20).
In this case ˜[j,i](t) is given by
˜[j,i](t) = e
Fj(t−Ta) [˜[j,i](Ta) +Hj (ρ[j](Ta) + φj,i(Ta))]
−Hj
(
ρ[j](t) + φj,i(t)
)
+
∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)Tjw[j](τ)dτ+
+
∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)
[(
TjBjKj − K̂j
)
ρ[j](τ)− K̂jφj,i(τ)
]
dτ,
(29)
where, similarly to (24) we used integration by parts. The
residual is r˜[j,i](t) = ˜[j,i](t) + ρ[j](t) + φj,i(t). We would
like to find a condition for which at time Td the inequality
|r˜[j,i](Td)| > ¯˜r[j,i](Td) is guaranteed to be satisfied for at
least one component of the residual.
Proposition 4: If exists time t = Td such that∣∣∣eFj(t−Ta)Hjφj,i(Ta) + Tjφj,i(Td)+
−
∫ Td
Ta
eFj(t−τ)K̂jφj,i(τ)dτ
∣∣∣∣∣ > 2¯˜r[j,i](Td)
(30)
is fulfilled for at least one component of ¯˜r[j,i](t), then attack
detection is guaranteed, for any value of ρ[j](t) and w[j](t).
D. Stealthy Attacks
We now define a condition on φj,i(t) causing an attack to
be undetectable by the UIO-based detection strategy.
Proposition 5: If the attack is designed in such a way that∣∣∣eFj(t−Ta)φj,i (Ta) + Tjφj,i(t)+
−
∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)K̂jφj,i(τ)dτ
∣∣∣∣ = 0 (31)
DGU 1 DGU 4
DGU 3
DGU 2
R34
R24
R23
R13
Fig. 1: Graph of DCmG considered in simulation. The blue lines
represent the power lines connecting the DGUs, and the red arrows
represent the communication graph. Note that communication links
are bidirectional, although links may be attacked in one direction
without the other being affected.
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Fig. 2: State evolution of voltages and currents of the DGUs. Ver-
tical lines show initial time of attack, in black, as well as detection
and isolation of attack on communications from DGUs 2 and 3, in
blue and red, respectively. In the highlighted window, a detail of
trajectories is presented, showing that consensus is not achieved in
presence of attack.
is satisfied for all t ≥ Ta, then its detection by the UIO-based
detection scheme is not possible.
Attacks satisfying Proposition 5 are part of a class of
attacks which are undetectable by the proposed methodology,
termed stealthy. Note that, to generate a stealthy attack as
in (31) the attacker must have a lot of information regarding
the filters of the UIO. The complete characterization of the
class of stealthy attacks is out of scope of this preliminary
paper, and will be the subject of further research.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed attack detection architecture is evaluated by
conducting simulations on MATLAB software. In Figure 1
we present the topology of the considered DC microgrid.
The same parameters as in [26] are used in the simulation
to define DGU matrices and controllers. In the following,
unless otherwise stated, currents are measured in A and
volts in V . Process and measurement noises are modeled
as random processes verifying Assumption 1, for all t ≥ 0,
where: w¯[i] = [0.1, 0.1, 0.01]
>
, and ρ¯[i] = [0.01, 0.01, 0]
>,
and where each scalar process is uncorrelated, and generated
from a uniform distribution on the corresponding interval.
We consider that, before time t = 1.5s, the DGUs are
disconnected. Then, after time Ta = 10s, the following
attack function affects transmitted measurements yc[2,4](t)
and yc[3,4](t):
φj,4(t) =
[
0 0.1 0
]T
,∀j ∈ N4 = {2, 3},∀t ≥ Ta.
(32)
Function (32) models an attack on the measurement of
the current communicated to compute secondary control
of DGU 4, which is equipped with a detector with two
UIOs computing estimates of the state of DGUs neighboring
DGU 4. The filter matrices for both the unknown-input
observers are designed as follows. For j ∈ {2, 3}, the second
column of Hj in (21) is [0.1, 0.9, 0.1]>, matrices Tj satisfy
(17), K˜j are such that eigenvalues of Fj = {−1,−1.5,−2},
and K¯j , K̂j are computed as in (18)-(19).
In Figure 2 we show the state evolution of Vi and Iti
for all the DGUs of the DCmG. The scaling factors in
(4) are taken to be the current ratings of each DGU, i.e.
Isti = 10A, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and Ist4 = 5A, therefore currents
are shown in p.u. Furthermore, this implies that consensus
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Fig. 3: Component-by-component comparison of residuals r˜[j,4](t)
(22) with their corresponding thresholds ¯˜r[2,4](t) (27), in continuous
and dotted lines, respectively. Those corresponding to estimate of
DGU 2 are in blue, whilst those for estimate of DGU 3 are in red.
Detection occurs when the residual of the first component of the
state crosses the corresponding threshold (vertical lines).
is achieved when currents are the same in Figure 2. Note
that, with the defined ratings, the attack in (32) corresponds
to [0, 0.02, 0]> p.u. Together with the state evolution of the
systems, in Figure 2 we present the time instance when
attack begins, t = Ta (black dashed line), as well as the
times at which the residuals r˜[2,4](t) and r˜[3,4](t) violate
their respective thresholds (in blue and red, respectively).
Additionally, in Figure 2 an enlarged portion of the evolution
of the current is also shown, to emphasize that consensus is
not achieved under attack.
Finally, we show the residuals from the UIOs which
estimate the neighboring states, in Figure 3. We see that
before time Ta, the estimates of the UIOs lie within the
bounds, whilst after the onset of the attack, the residuals
increase until they cross the threshold, thus detection is
achieved at times Td,2 = 10.4s and Td,3 = 11.18s. Note that
detection time is also isolation time, at which the detector
of DGU 4 is able to identify the communication line over
which the information is compromised.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have introduced a distributed attack
detection and isolation methodology for DC microgrids.
Each DGU locally computes estimates of its neighbors’ states
through UIOs. In the paper, local detection thresholds are de-
signed, and detectability analysis is performed. Furthermore,
a class of stealthy attacks is identified. As future work, we
aim to conduct further analysis in the design of the matrices
of the UIOs, in order to minimize their effect on the size
of the detection threshold. Moreover, we aim to study the
possibility of developing a reconfiguration strategy to restore
consensus in the event of an attack.
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